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Book Reviews
G

Financial Economics

Loan Sharks: The Birth of Predatory Lending. By
Charles R. Geisst. Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press, 2017. Pp. ix, 261. $26.00,
cloth. ISBN 978–0–8157–2900–6, cloth; 978–
0–8157–2901–3, e-book.
JEL 2017–1012
The title of this book, Loan Sharks: The Birth
of Predatory Lending, is misleading. Most people would expect a history of the early years of
consumer finance, in which unlicensed high-cost
lenders dominated. That is indeed part of the
book. But the book is more accurately described
as a somewhat haphazard, popular account of
major developments in US financial history from
1890 through 1935. The theme that the author,
Charles R. Geisst, hopes will unite the topics is
“loan sharking,” which he defines broadly to mean
high-cost lending, whether for consumer finance,
mortgage loans, or stock market speculation.
The first two chapters discuss consumer finance
and farm mortgages, as well as sundry other topics, from about 1890 through 1920. In that era,
several states maintained a 6 percent ceiling
on annual interest rates. As Geisst recognizes,
“Even at double the legal rate, legitimate lenders would find it difficult to make small loans due
to the administrative costs and work involved”
(p. 81). In fact, banks of that era did not provide
consumer loans; this gap was filled by unlicensed
lenders, such as the salary buyers and pawnbrokers common in urban areas. Salary buyers were
the illegal “payday lenders” of the time, providing workers with advances on their salaries at
interest rates of 10–20 percent per month. Geisst
does not explain the economic rationale for such
high rates in competitive markets. As the era progressed, some states passed laws allowing annual
interest rates over 6 percent on consumer loans.
This permitted philanthropists, religious groups,
and others to form mutual loan societies, credit
unions, industrial banks, and remedial loan organizations to provide consumer credit on terms
more favorable than those of the illegal lenders.
In the case of Midwestern farm mortgages, local
lenders often originated them and sold them to
Northeastern insurance companies. Interest
rates on these loans were about 2 percentage
points higher than those for farm mortgages in
the Northeast, a gap Geisst attributes to “loan
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sharking.” His economic rationale is muddled:
“. . . it would be expected that the presence of so
many competing lenders would have forced loan
sharks out of business. But in reality, all lenders,
legitimate and otherwise, wanted to be in the
high-interest lending business” (p. 29). As Geisst
explains, in 1916, Congress passed the Federal
Farm Loan Act, which created federal land banks
to support agricultural credit markets. Other topics covered in these chapters include: the greenback exceptions clause; restrictions on foreign
ownership of land; speculation on commodities at
the Chicago Board of Trade; the absence of a federal income tax; the Panic of 1893; the rise of layaway credit for consumer purchases; the Panic of
1907 and birth of the Federal Reserve System; the
Pujo Committee hearings on “money trusts”; and
stock market speculation and state Blue Sky laws.
Chapter 3 covers the period from about 1920
through 1927. In this era, the Russell Sage
Foundation pushed states to adopt a Uniform
Small Loan Law (USLL) allowing annualized
interest rates of 36 percent. It argued this was
necessary for the development of a legal smallloan market. Geisst (p. 232) views this rate as
excessive, writing, “. . . the rates allowed under
the USLL hardly were fair or just. It is difficult
to imagine a borrower realistically being able to
repay debts when the legal borrowing rate ranged
from 30–40 percent per year.” Nevertheless,
many states enacted versions of the USLL and
licensed, for-profit consumer finance companies
opened. The chapter also reviews the Florida
land boom, the high failure rate of small statechartered banks, the spread of mortgage-based
securities and commercial real estate financing in
New York City, concerns about German reparation payments, the McFadden Act of 1927, and
the rise of the call loan market for stock market
speculation.
Chapters 4 and 5 cover the lead up to, and
aftermath of, the Great Depression. In the late
1920s, many households carried heavy debt
burdens. In some states, there were efforts to
set more restrictive usury ceilings than permitted under the USLL since, “…most had come
to realize that lending small amounts at 36 percent interest was no bargain for the borrower”
(p. 155). Chapter 4 reviews the late-1920s debate
over proper Federal Reserve policy in response
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to rising debt levels and stock market fervor. As
Geisst notes, nonfinancial firms actively lent in
the booming call loan market. Chapter 5 provides a familiar recounting of the government’s
response to the financial disruptions of the Great
Depression. These include the creation of Federal
Home Loan Banks to buy performing mortgages
from savings banks, the Home Owners’ Loan
Corporation to purchase delinquent mortgages
from banks, the Federal Housing Administration,
and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.
Chapter 5 also discusses the Pecora hearings, the
Glass–Steagall Act, reforming the Fed to create
the open market committee and a unified discount rate, and Regulation Q.
In a postscript, Geisst (p. 235) argues in favor
of usury laws but, “No single fi xed rate is (or was)
agreeable as a usury ceiling, and that casts a long
shadow over the intellectual basis of usury ceilings because critics maintain that any rate is arbitrary and political.” Geisst (p. 236) proposes that,
rather than a fi xed interest-rate ceiling, usury laws
should set a limit on the spread over some benchmark interest rate to “. . . allow lending rates to
adjust to market conditions while still protecting
borrowers from the vagaries of the market.”
The book has several weaknesses. It tries to
cover too many topics in just 236 pages and,
necessarily, many are treated very superficially.
There is no coherent framework that links the
various topics. There are no tables or graphs to
show trends or put data points in perspective.
Despite this, readers certainly won’t miss one or
two key themes, e.g., consumers often pay very
high interest rates for closed-ended small loans,
but readers will wonder why the greenback exclusion clause is relevant. For those who would like a
more engaging and focused account of consumer
credit over much of the same period covered by
Geisst, I recommend Financing the American
Dream by Lendol Calder (1999).
Economists will be frustrated that the book
lacks any serious discussion of the factors that
create variation in interest rates at a point in
time. High-cost loans can be explained by large
risk-screening and monitoring costs relative to
the size of the loan, risks of loan losses, lenders’ market power, borrowers’ ignorance, etc.
Geisst mentions some of these factors, but it is
always in passing with no serious analysis. A good

counterexample is Kenneth A. Snowden’s (2013)
history of the mortgage market at the turn of the
twentieth century. He attributes higher farm
mortgage rates in the Midwest to high information and monitoring costs faced by people in the
capital-abundant Northeast who saw loan opportunities in other regions of the country. This
makes more sense than vague charges of “loan
sharking”. Similarly, Geisst includes no serious
analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of
his proposal to revise usury laws to set limits on
spreads over interest rate benchmarks.
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The Economics of Tax Policy. Edited By Alan J.
Auerbach and Kent Smetters. Oxford and New
York: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. x, 390.
ISBN 978–0–19–061972–5, cloth.
JEL 2017–0951
As the editors of this volume observe in their
opening chapter, major changes have occurred,
in both the US economy and in what researchers know about the effects of taxes, since the last
major federal tax reform, the Tax Reform Act of
1986. This book provides background information on a wide array of tax topics and proposes
relevant, research-based reforms. Each chapter
covers a separate aspect of the federal tax code
and is authored by an expert from that field of
research. Together, the chapters are stunning in
their breadth, exploring everything from environmental taxation, to capital gains and estate
taxation, to tax compliance. A thoughtful discussion by another leading scholar in each field
follows each chapter. These discussions provide
additional perspective on each of the topics.
The chapters generally begin with a background section covering both the history and the
intended purpose of the current design of the

